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The present study assessed how children with a range of cognitive abilities fared 
during a mock cross-examination. Ninety children (aged 4 to 11 years; 18 with intellectual 
disabilities [ID], 13 with borderline intellectual disabilities [BID], and 59 who were typically 
developing [TD]) witnessed a staged event, participated in an initial forensic interview (a few 
days later), and were cross-examined by a barrister-in-training (ten months later). During 
cross-examination, 98% of all children changed at least one response from their initial 
interview when challenged.  However, group differences in performance (total number of 
changed responses, ‘resistance’ to challenges), controlling for age and memory for event 
details, were not significant or did not prove reliable at the level of individual group 
contrasts.  Overall, little robust evidence for group differences in performance on cross-
examination could be identified, and memory for event details was the most reliable predictor 
of performance.   
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Cross-examination of children with and without intellectual disabilities 
In an adversarial system of justice such as that of the UK, Australia and the USA, 
there is a strong emphasis on oral testimony from witnesses about the facts of a disputed case 
(Ellison, 2001). In court, following the presentation of direct evidence by the prosecution 
(testimony from the victim, witness or defendant), cross-examination is undertaken by 
opposing counsel to challenge the reliability of a witness’s evidence and, ostensibly, to search 
for the truth (Wellman, 1986; Yarmey, 1979). Effective cross-examination highlights 
inconsistencies in witness testimony. Yet the techniques employed to do this, such as 
pressing the witness to change their response (Zajac, Gross & Hayne, 2003), accusing the 
witness of lying (Davies, Henderson & Seymour, 1997; Plotnikoff & Woolfson, 2009; 
Spencer, 2012), repetitive and complex questioning (Plotnikoff & Woolfson, 2012; Zajac, 
2009) and deliberately setting the sequence of questioning to confuse the witness (Glissan, 
1991) are, in reality, concerned with discrediting a witness (Henderson, 2002). The demands 
on a witness to produce reliable oral evidence, often many months or even years, after an 
event are high, and witnesses find the process stressful, aggressive and anxiety provoking 
(Plotnikoff & Woolfson, 2009, 2012; Zajac, 2009).  
Legal reforms to procedures during evidence gathering and submission of evidence-
in-chief to courts have taken place in a number of countries over the last 20 years, to protect 
children and other vulnerable witnesses. In England and Wales, guidelines such as the 
Memorandum of Good Practice (Home Office, 1992) and Achieving Best Evidence (ABE: 
Ministry of Justice, 2011) as well as other highly regarded protocols (e.g. NICHD: Kuehnle 
& Connell, 2009; Lamb, Herskowitz, Orbach & Esplin, 2008; Lamb, La Rooy, Malloy & 
Katz, 2011) maximise the use of open-ended prompts and ensure that interviewing techniques 
avoid suggesting information about the events under discussion.  As well as ensuring that a 
child’s ‘best evidence’ is obtained, these guidelines aim to reduce stress and delay (Zajac, 
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2009).  If a case comes to court in England and Wales, video recordings of forensic 
interviews should be used to replace (in full or in part) direct examination by the prosecution. 
However, the questions (and questioning style) used during cross-examination often run 
counter to available research/protocols, and the use of ABE  guidelines does not extend to the 
process of cross-examination.  In fact, legal professionals show considerable resistance to 
proposals to alter cross-examination procedures (see Spencer & Lamb, 2012; Zajac, O’Neill, 
& Hayne, 2012, for a discussion). Consequently, children are exposed to the same cross-
examination techniques that are used on adults (Zajac, 2009).   
The negative impact of cross-examination on children’s testimony was noted by 
Zajac, Gross and Hayne (2003), who examined the real-life court transcripts of 5-13 year old 
children who were key witnesses in sexual abuse trials. During cross-examination, 75% of 
these children changed at least one aspect of their testimony, with some withdrawing 
allegations of abuse completely. Children rarely asked for clarification, and also attempted to 
answer questions that they did not understand. However, the nature of this study meant that it 
was not possible to provide an objective ‘ground truth’ benchmark for the accuracy of the 
children’s original responses. 
In an empirical investigation of cross-examination performance addressing this issue, 
Turtle and Wells (1988) showed 8-12 year old children (and a sample of adults) a short video 
on which they were subsequently interviewed and subjected to cross-examination. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, they found that all participants were less accurate during cross-examination 
than during the initial interview, an effect that was particularly pronounced for younger 
children. However, only a few cross-examination questions were asked and the nature of 
these questions is unclear (Zajac, 2009). In addition, there was only a 24 hour period between 
the initial interview and cross-examination, which is not representative of the average delay 
in actual proceedings. Current estimates of delay vary, and depend on the type of court and 
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the jurisdiction. However, in Crown Courts in England and Wales, delays can be up to 30 
months (from the time of the defendant’s first court appearance rather than disclosure by the 
child), with an average of around 8 months (Plotnikoff & Woolfson, 2012). Delays are 
considerably longer elsewhere, for example, in Northern Ireland and New Zealand 
(Henderson, 2012). Therefore, the length of time between a child providing their initial 
evidence to the police and their appearance in court can be considerable. 
 In an experimental study with realistic time delays, Zajac and Hayne (2003) 
conducted initial interviews six weeks after 5-6 year old children viewed a live event (as 
opposed to a video). Cross-examinations took place nine months later (ten months after the 
event). The researchers found that 85% of children made at least one change to their previous 
statements and one third changed all of their original responses (also see Zajac, Jury, & 
O’Neill, 2009). A less pronounced, but equally worrying, pattern was subsequently observed 
in older children (aged 9-10 years), with 70% changing at least one response during cross-
examination (Zajac & Hayne, 2006). Of particular concern, 43% of this older group changed 
their originally correct answers to incorrect ones. 
For children with an intellectual disability (ID), who are likely to have poorer 
cognitive abilities (Brown & Geislman, 1990) and greater levels of suggestibility (e.g. 
London, Henry, Conradt & Corser, 2013) than typically developing (TD) children of the 
same chronological age, cross-examination may prove even more problematic (Zajac et al., 
2012). ID is ‘the most common developmental disorder and the most handicapping of the 
disorders beginning in childhood’ (Harris, 2006). It is characterised by significant cognitive 
deficits (an IQ < 70) that have an onset before the age of 18, and significant difficulties with 
adaptive functioning (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Those children who display 
IQs between the range for children with ID and TD children (i.e. those with IQs of 70-84) are 
described as having ‘borderline ID’ (Alloway, 2010). Children and adults with ID are a 
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heterogeneous group (Kebbell & Hatton, 1999) and their overall IQ scores alone tell us 
relatively little about their cognitive and behavioural profiles. Nevertheless, they are a 
vulnerable population (Westcott & Jones, 1999) who are at increased risk of maltreatment, 
abuse, and sexual violence (Brown & Stein, 1998; Hershkowitz, Lamb & Horowitz, 2007; 
Lin, Yen, Kuo, Wu & Lin, 2009; Sullivan & Knutson, 2000; Westcott, 1991), as well as often 
being the only witnesses to others’ crimes against those with ID (Milne, 1999).  
Individuals with ID may not participate fully in the legal system as victims and 
witnesses (Kebbell & Hatton, 1999; Zajac et al., 2012) for several reasons, including a lack of 
identification as victims by authorities, as well as communication problems (Kendall-Tackett, 
Lyon, Taliaferro, & Little, 2005). Individuals with ID are also perceived as less credible 
witnesses than their typical peers (Henry, Ridley, Perry, & Crane, 2011; Peled, Iarocci, & 
Connolly, 2004) and their access to justice may be hindered by the unwarranted assumption 
that they are inherently unreliable as witnesses (Peled et al., 2004). In actual fact, children 
with ID are under-researched in the eyewitness testimony literature and little is known about 
the competencies of these children within the adversarial system and how they would cope 
with cross-examination.  
In relation to initial questioning following a witnessed event, children with ID have 
been found to produce limited detail in response to free recall instructions, but the 
information that they do provide is nevertheless very accurate (Henry & Gudjonsson, 1999; 
2004; Michel, Gordon, Ornstein & Simpson, 2000; although see Agnew & Powell, 2004). 
Children with ID are no more suggestible than children of a similar mental age (Henry & 
Gudjonsson, 1999; Jens, Gordon and Shaddock, 1990; Michel et al., 2000) and although they 
generally show greater suggestibility than children of a similar chronological age, this is not 
always the case (Agnew & Powell, 2004; Henry & Gudjonsson, 2003). However, children 
with ID require more questioning to elicit information (Agnew & Powell, 2004) and are 
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slightly more vulnerable to misleading ‘yes/no’ questions (Henry & Gudjonsson, 1999; 
2003). They also find repeated questioning problematic, with a substantial number changing 
their responses to such questions (Cederborg, Danielsson, La Rooy, & Lamb, 2009; Henry & 
Gudjonsson, 2003). Performance appears to be related to level of ID: children with moderate 
ID experience a greater number of difficulties than children with mild/borderline ID (Brown, 
Lewis, Lamb & Stephens, 2012; Henry & Gudjonsson, 2003; Michel et al., 2000). However, 
little is known about the capabilities of children with borderline ID (IQs of 70-84) in this 
regard. Brown et al. (2012) assessed children with mild-borderline ID but did not report data 
separately for those in the borderline group, therefore one of the aims of the current study 
was to distinguish between those with mild/moderate and borderline ID.  
Despite several research studies providing an insight into the strengths and difficulties 
of children with ID during initial interviews,  there has been a lack of empirical research 
undertaken to assess how children with ID fare during cross-examination (Kebbell, Hatton, & 
Johnson, 2004; Zajac et al., 2012). As children with ID experience difficulties with exactly 
the types of questions that characterise the cross-examination process (e.g., repeated, 
complex and suggestive questions), cross-examination may pose greater problems for 
children with ID than for TD children (Zajac et al., 2012). Further, lawyers and judges are 
unlikely to adapt their practices to meet the needs of individuals with ID (Kebbell et al., 
2004), with court transcripts revealing that the technique of cross-examination is ‘particularly 
poor’ for eliciting accurate information from witnesses with ID (Kebbell et al., 2004). This is 
an extremely important issue to address bearing in mind the current debate across many 
countries that use an adversarial system; namely, should very young children, or individuals 
with ID, be exempted from cross-examination in court? (Spencer, 2012).  
Based in the UK, the current study explored how 4-11-year-old children with and  
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without ID fared during a mock cross-examination. To achieve this, all children 
viewed a structured live event (a magic show), and participated in an initial interview 
(following ABE guidelines) 3-6 days later. Ten months later, they underwent an ecologically 
valid cross-examination by a barrister-in-training. In line with previous research, it was 
predicted that performance during the initial interview would be affected by the child’s level 
of ID; the more severe the ID, the more likely they would be to produce fewer items of 
information (although what they did recall was predicted to be just as accurate). In relation to 
cross-examination, predictions were more tentative given the absence of existing literature.  It 
was hypothesised that all children would change a large proportion of their answers, in line 
with work on TD children, but that the number of changes may differ as a function of ID 
level: the greater the level of ID, the less resilient to cross-examination challenges the child 
would be (changing a higher number of responses and ceding at an earlier stage of the cross-
examination challenge).  We were also careful to control for two important variables in all 
analyses before examining group differences. These were age (it was assumed that younger 
children would be more vulnerable to cross-examination) and recall for details of the event 
(we included a set of ‘unchallenged’ questions about basic information from the witnessed 
event; these questions were interspersed between the cross-examination challenges to provide 




The sample comprised 90 children (40 males) aged 4 years 7 months to 11 years 1 
month (mean = 8 years 9 months, SD = 1 year 8 months). This age range was selected as it 
allowed an examination of the role of age on cross-examination performance (encompassing 
a range of ages utilised in previous research), but was restricted enough to ensure that the 
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staged event was suitable for all of the children. All participants attended either an ‘inclusive’ 
mixed ability mainstream primary school or a ‘special school’ for children with learning 
disabilities, both of which were located in Greater London. Using a measure of intellectual 
ability (the Stanford Binet Version 5; Roid, 2003), those children with an IQ between 35 and 
69 were classified as having a mild to moderate level of ID (n=18); those with an IQ between 
70 and 84 were classified as having Borderline ID (n=13); and those with an IQ of 85 and 
higher were classified as being typically developing (TD; n=59). The TD group included a 
number of children who were younger than the ID and BID groups, but whose mental ages 
were equivalent to those with ID. As such, the TD group included children with both 
chronological and mental ages of a similar range to those in the ID sample. This is in line 
with a ‘developmental trajectories’ approach (Thomas, Annaz, Ansari, Scerif, Jarrold, & 
Karmiloff-Smith, 2009), which ensures that comparison samples reflect the range of abilities 
of the target sample, as opposed to being individually matched on specified variables.  
The children with ID and BID were of mixed aetiology with no specific diagnoses 
made available to the researchers. The TD group had no special needs classifications and did 
not attend any additional special classes.  See Table 1 for participant information.   
 
[Place Table 1 about here] 
 
Materials and Procedure  
This study was conducted in three phases. 
Phase 1 – Staged event. The children viewed one of seven identical live, scripted 
magic shows at their school. In an attempt to minimise schema driven memories of magic 
shows, where a script might include a man in a traditional black cape and top hat, the 
magician was female (‘Auntie Julie’) and dressed in a colourful outfit. The show consisted of 
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eight tricks (presented in the same order each time) and lasted 20 minutes. To encourage the 
children (particularly the older ones) to attend fully to the content of the show, the magician 
explained at the start that she needed their help in testing out a new show for young children 
in hospital and that, at the close of the show, a ‘vote’ would take place to see what age range 
the show was suitable for (5 year olds, 10 year olds, or everybody). To further maximize the 
children’s attention to the event, the show included a number of tricks requiring all children 
to interact with the magician both verbally (‘call out’) and non-verbally (‘point’). A small 
number of the children (two per show) were also asked to assist the magician with a trick but, 
as their experience was qualitatively different to that of their peers in the audience (in that 
they viewed the show from a different perspective), their data were not included. At the end 
of the show, the children did not receive an instruction regarding whether or not they could 
discuss the show with their classmates; this would not necessarily occur in an actual criminal 
investigation and, given the number of children who viewed the show, it was not possible to 
reliably enforce such an instruction. 
Phase 2 – Initial interview. All children were interviewed 3-6 days after the event by 
one of two female researchers who were not present at the magic show. Interviewer 1 was a 
former police officer with specialised training in interviewing children: Interviewer 1 trained 
Interviewer 2 prior to the study.  The format for the interviews was discussed and agreed 
beforehand and all interviews were conducted according to Achieving Best Evidence (ABE) 
guidelines in place in England and Wales at the time (Home Office, 2007).  Interviews were 
overtly video and audio taped. They lasted approximately 30-40 minutes, but varied for each 
child depending on how much they could remember (particularly during the initial free 
recall). For details of the initial interview please see Appendix 1. 
Free recall was coded by giving children one point for every correct piece of 
information about the show, and these were recorded (e.g. ‘the lady [1 point] did tricks [1 
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point]’, ‘the lady made Harry Potter’s wand fall off the table [5 points]’ and ‘I saw a show [1 
point]’). Prompted general recall was coded in the same way: children received one point for 
each correct piece of information over and above that provided in free recall. Prompted 
specific recall was coded in the same way except that children received credit for information 
already recalled during free or prompted general recall. Errors, coded across categories of 
prompt were defined as: mistakes of detail (e.g. getting the colour of the magician’s hair 
wrong); and, confabulated information concerning details added by the child that did not 
occur (e.g. the magician fell over and banged her head). Responses such as ‘I’m not sure’ or 
‘I can’t remember’ were combined as ‘don’t know’ responses. A random sample of 25% of 
these interviews were coded for consistency (across all items; free and prompted general and 
specific recall) by two independent raters (r = .89).  
Phase 3 – Cross-examination interview. To reflect current court delays in England 
and Wales, all children underwent a mock cross-examination at their school ten months after 
the initial interviews. These were conducted by nine barristers-in-training, who each 
volunteered to perform multiple interviews (range = 5 to 23 interviews; mode = 6). Each 
child was taken individually from their class to a quiet room and given a brief explanation of 
the running order of the session. They were advised that they would be meeting a barrister, 
and an age-appropriate explanation of the barrister’s role was given.  The children were asked 
if they were happy to proceed, and all were.  
After conveying and introducing each child to the barrister, the first author left the 
room and the barrister said ‘I’m going to show you a video that you made a few months ago 
with a lady called (name inserted here). You need to watch the video carefully and listen to 
what you said to her. I’m then going to ask you some questions about what you said, and I 
need you to listen carefully and then answer me truthfully, ok?’ 
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Children watched the video of their initial interview alongside the barrister-in-training 
(excluding the rapport and truth/lies phase). This was in order to adhere to  required practice 
in England and Wales, whereby children’s evidence is provided to the court as pre-recorded 
evidence-in-chief under ‘Special Measures’ (in England and Wales), prior to cross-
examination (Home Office, 2007; HM Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate/HM 
Inspectorate of Constabulary, 2012). Barristers were instructed to direct the child back to the 
video if their attention wandered, as may occur in an actual criminal case. The barrister 
stopped the video evidence after they had both viewed it in full and said to the child ‘Now I 
am going to ask you some questions about this video.’  
In court, cross-examination interviews usually flow in a manner dependent on what 
arises during questioning. As this study needed to balance ecological validity with 
experimental rigor, the cross-examination questions were structured to allow children’s 
performance to be compared directly. To achieve this, elements of the magic show on which 
all children had been able to answer questions in the initial interview were identified. A set of 
draft questions common to all the children, and easily adapted to take into account individual 
variations in actual testimony, was formulated. Four-part structured challenges were then 
drafted, designed to exert increasing pressure upon the child to change their responses from 
their earlier testimony. Barristers-in-training were directed to complete all four parts of each 
of the challenge questions unless, and until, the child ceded to a challenge. At that point, they 
immediately moved on to the next question. If the child said that they did not know the 
answer, the barrister moved on to the next question. For examples please see Appendix 2. 
Although the child participants were under the impression that the questions were 
entirely derived from their evidence, in fact the questions were closely scripted to ensure that 
each child was asked identical topic-related questions. A number of the topic-related 
questions were tailored to reflect the child’s actual testimony, adding to the effect that the 
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child was being challenged on their own evidence (e.g., all children were asked about the 
magician’s three coloured handkerchiefs, but the colours used in the question reflected those 
that they had specified in the initial interview).  
The full cross-examination interview included 23 questions, of which 12 were 
challenges to their earlier evidence. A further 11 were straightforward unchallenged questions 
from the initial interview (not misleading or designed to confuse the child), and scores on 
these questions served as an important control measure in the analyses, namely, ‘recall for 
unchallenged details of the event’.  The unchallenged questions were alternated with the 
challenged questions to produce a more realistic flow to the interview and also to allow the 
child breathing space between the larger four-part challenging questions. Challenges were on 
a range of general (n = 4) and specific (n = 8) details, and covered both events that did 
happen (n = 8) and events that did not happen (n = 4). Examples from the interview protocol 
are included in Appendix 1. The entire cross-examination session lasted about 45 minutes 
(this included the time taken for the children to watch their initial interview; the actual cross-
examination questioning lasted around 20-25 minutes). All children were instructed not to 
discuss the session with their classmates. 
The data were coded on a number of parameters. First, the overall number of changed 
responses (out of the 12 four-point challenges put to the children) was calculated, to measure 
the child’s resistance to cross-examination (referred to as the ‘total number of cedes’). A 
score of zero was assigned if the child did not change a response, and a score of one was 
assigned if they ceded to cross-examination pressures (max score = 12). An outright change 
to their testimony (Q: ‘Are you sure the magician did tricks?’, A: ‘No’), agreement with the 
barrister on any challenge (Q: ‘I don’t believe you did see the book change, did you?’, A: ‘I 
didn’t’), or an acceptance of a different explanation (Q: ‘If your friends said the magician 
didn’t do tricks, they would be right, wouldn’t they?’, A: ‘They might be’) would all be 
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accepted as ceding to the challenge. ‘I don’t know’ or similar responses were not taken as 
ceding to a challenge. Where the child offered their own words to back up their version of 
events, rather than answer the challenge directly, this was also coded as not ceding. The child 
had to explicitly give way during the question in order to be classified as having ceded to 
cross-examination. When the barrister deemed the child to have ceded to cross-examination, 
he/she moved onto the next question or challenge (N.B. an independent coder listened to all 
cross-examination interviews and there were no instances in which the coder disagreed with 
the barrister’s decision that the child ceded or did not cede to cross-examination).  
Second, a measure of ‘susceptibility to cross-examination’ was calculated. If a child 
ceded, responses were assigned a score of 1, 2, 3, or 4 depending upon when during the four-
part challenge process the child gave way (1 = ceded only at the fourth challenge; 2 = ceded 
after three challenges; 3 = ceded after two challenges; 4 = ceded at the first challenge). A 
score of 0 was assigned if the child did not cede to cross-examination. Hence, on a scale of 0 
to 48, higher scores indicated that the child was ceding early in the process and was thus less 
resilient to cross-examination.  
Third, responses to the unchallenged questions about the event (repeated from the 
initial interview) were totalled, with one point being assigned for each correct answer 
(maximum score = 11).   
 
Results 
Initial interview. The first step of the analysis was to examine the performance of the 
children during the initial interview to ensure that, as well as remembering the show, enough 
detail had been provided by the children for the subsequent cross-examinations to be 
developed and undertaken. As can be seen in Table 2, each child (irrespective of their level of 
intellectual functioning) recalled attending the show and provided at least one accurate detail 
 Cross-examination of children with and without intellectual disability 
15 
 
about it during either free or prompted recall. Therefore, the first test of whether the 
population could be tested in such a manner was resolved. A sufficient number of details 
were provided in each group (see Table 2 for details), to allow a coherent cross-examination 
interview protocol to be constructed. 
 
[Place Table 2 about here]  
 
To explore group differences in the performance of the children during the initial 
interviews, three hierarchical multiple regression analyses were conducted with (a) the 
number of correct details provided during free recall, (b) the number of correct details 
provided during prompted general recall, and (c) the number of correct details provided 
during prompted specific recall, each included as dependent variables [Note that for all 
regression analyses reported in this paper, key statistical checks (e.g. Durbin–Watson, 
tolerance/variance inflation factor (VIF) statistics, Cook’s/Mahalanobis distances, 
standardised DF betas, plots of standardized residuals/predicted standardised values, 
standardised residuals and partial plots) suggested the absence of both multicollinearity and 
cases with undue influence, and revealed no evidence for outliers (Field, 2013)].  
Chronological age was entered at Step 1 of each regression to control for differences 
in performance as a function of age, as this variable had not been matched across groups. The 
dummy coded group variables (ID, BID) were entered at Step 2 (TD children were always 
included as the reference group, to assess whether, after controlling for age, group differences 
in performance remained; the dummy variables provided information concerning whether the 
ID and TD groups differed, and whether the BID and TD groups differed). Note that the 
results of the regression analyses remained the same when IQ scores were included in the 
model as a continuous variable, therefore these analyses are not reported in the paper. 
 Cross-examination of children with and without intellectual disability 
16 
 
Summary details for Step 2 of these regressions are reported in Table 3.  Significant 
group differences (indicated by a significant change in R2 at Step 2) were found for prompted 
general and prompted specific recall. Inspection of the beta-values revealed the nature of the 
group differences.  With regards to prompted general recall, both the ID and BID groups 
recalled fewer accurate details than the TD group. For the prompted specific recall questions, 
the ID group recalled fewer accurate details than the TD group, whilst there was no 
difference between the performance of the BID and TD groups. There was no overall 
significant effect for group at Step 2 of the regression for free recall, suggesting an absence of 
group differences on this variable. However, inspection of the beta-values indicated that 
children with ID recalled fewer correct details than children in the TD group. Nevertheless, 
this finding must be regarded with caution given the lack of significance overall for Step 2 of 
the regression. Across all three variables of interest in these analyses, age was a significant 
positive predictor of performance, as would be expected.   
The total numbers of errors, confabulations and ‘do not know’ responses generated by 
participants during each of the free and prompted recall phases were rather low, meaning that 
the data were not suitable for individual analyses. Therefore, the total numbers of errors and 
confabulations from the free and prompted (general and specific) recall phases were 
combined to form an overall index of ‘error responses’ prior to analysis. However, the more 
detailed mean scores as a function of participant group and questioning type are included in 
Table 2, for descriptive purposes. Hierarchical multiple regression analyses (see Table 3) 
demonstrated no overall group effect (i.e., no change in R2 at Step 2) on this error responses 
measure, indicating that all children (regardless of ID status) reported a similar number of 
errors. Age made a significant contribution to the model; as expected, older children made 
fewer errors than younger children. 




[Place Table 3 about here]  
 
 
Cross-examination interview. The second phase of the analyses explored our more 
novel hypotheses concerning the performance of children with and without ID under cross-
examination. Means and standard deviations for the relevant measures (presented by group) 
are included in Table 4: (a) The total number of cedes (highest possible score = 12); (b) How 
susceptible the child was to cross-examination (i.e., at which stage of the four-point 
challenges did the child change their answer; highest possible score = 48); and (c) The total 
number of correct answers given in response to straightforward unchallenged questions 
(‘recall for unchallenged details’, highest possible score = 11).  This latter score was used to 
control for current level of recall for details of the event.  This ensured that the quality of the 
child’s recall for important details when questioned using non-challenging prompts was taken 
into account in assessing group differences in cross-examination performance.  
Inspection of Table 4 demonstrates that, on average, children (in all three participant 
groups) changed at least half of the answers that they gave during the initial interview when 
challenged about their evidence. Further inspection of the data revealed that 97.8% of the 
entire sample ceded to at least one challenge during cross-examination. Broken down 
according to sample, all of the children in the ID and BID groups ceded to at least one of the 
12 cross-examination challenges, as did 96.7% of the TD group. However, all children were 
able accurately to respond to at least one of the 11 unchallenged recall questions. 
 
[Place Table 4 about here]  
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Hierarchical multiple regression analyses were conducted to explore group 
differences in performance on the cross-examination interviews, whilst controlling for age 
and recall for unchallenged details of the event. Two regressions were carried out, one for 
total numbers of cedes and one for susceptibility to cross-examination. In each regression, 
age was entered at Step 1, recall for unchallenged details was entered at Step 2, and the 
dummy coded group variables (ID, BID) were entered at Step 3 (TD children were always the 
reference group). Note that the results of the regression analyses remained the same when IQ 
scores were included in the model as a continuous variable, therefore these analyses are not 
reported in the paper. Tables 5 and 6 summarise information for each regression model.  
For the total number of cedes, Step 3 of the model (with all predictor variables 
entered) indicated that there was no overall group effect (no significant change in R2 at Step 3 
when the dummy-group variables were entered).  This indicated that all children (regardless 
of ID status) changed their responses to the same degree once age and recall for unchallenged 
details had been accounted for. The p-value for group differences in total number of cedes 
was not significant (p < .09), suggesting that neither of the ID groups differed from the 
typical children (in addition, both contrasts were non-significant).   Scores on recall for 
unchallenged details were highly significant predictors for total number of cedes (p < .001) 
according to the beta-values at Step 3. Children with lower recall performance (i.e. poorer 
memory for event details at the time of cross-examination) were more likely to cede during 
cross-examination challenges.  Age made no significant contribution to the overall model 
once scores on recall for unchallenged details had been entered at Step 2 of the model.  It 
could be argued that including the variable ‘recall for unchallenged details’ might account for 
some of the variation between groups, hence reducing the possibility of finding group 
differences.  In order to test this, the regression was repeated with just two predictor 
variables, age and group.  There were no significant group differences in the total numbers of 
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cedes, but age remained a significant predictor of performance at Step 2 of the model (p < 
.01).   
[Place Table 5 about here] 
 
For the more sensitive measure of susceptibility to cross-examination (i.e., how long 
it took the child to cede during each of the 12 four-point challenges; not at all [0], or at 
challenge 1, 2, 3 or 4), Step 3 of the model (with all predictors entered) illustrated that there 
was a significant group effect (indicated by a significant change in R2 at Step 3, p < .05). This 
indicated that once age and scores on recall for unchallenged details had been accounted for, 
group made a significant contribution to the model.  However, inspection of the beta-values 
at Step 3 indicated that neither of the individual contrasts (typical children versus those with 
BID, typical children versus those with ID) were significant.  Therefore, although there was 
an overall group difference in susceptibility to cross-examination, this needs to be treated 
with caution because the individual beta-values did not reveal significant group differences 
(and the 95% confidence intervals for the B-values were large and crossed zero, indicating 
that they were poor predictors). Scores on recall for unchallenged details made a highly 
significant contribution to the model (p < .001) according to beta-values at Step 3 of the 
model.  Children with lower recall (i.e. poorer memory for event details at the time of cross-
examination) were more susceptible to cross-examination challenges.  Age did not make a 
significant contribution to the model once scores on recall for unchallenged details had been 
entered at Step 2.     
 
[Place Table 6 about here] 
 




The current study assessed the performance of 4-11 year old children, with a range of 
intellectual abilities, in an initial forensic interview and when cross-examined about their 
accounts of a previously witnessed event. During cross-examination, 97.8% of all children 
changed at least one response from their initial interview when challenged.  However, group 
differences in performance (total number of changed responses, ‘resistance’ to challenges), 
controlling for age and memory for event details, were not significant or did not prove 
reliable at the level of individual group contrasts.  Overall, little robust evidence for group 
differences in performance on cross-examination could be identified, and memory for event 
details was the most reliable predictor of performance.   
Our findings are in line with previous research on the cross-examination of child 
witnesses with TD (Zajac & Hayne, 2003; 2006). All children with ID ceded to at least one 
cross-examination challenge, with only two (TD) children in the entire sample showing 
complete resilience to cross-examination. Indeed, mean scores indicated that, on average, 
children in each of the three groups ceded to at least half of the cross-examination challenges. 
These findings suggest even higher rates of changed responses than those reported in 
previous research on this topic (e.g., Zajac & Hayne, 2003; 2006), possibly due to the use of 
trained legal professionals rather than researchers to conduct interviews. This may have 
increased the negative impact of cross-examination in the current study.  The findings also 
imply that the cross-examination of young children has a negative and deleterious effect on 
the reliability of their testimony.   
Regarding the issue of whether the children with ID and BID ceded to cross-
examination pressures to a greater degree than TD children, effects were broadly negative.  
There was no overall significant difference as a function of participant group (ID, BID or TD) 
in relation to the total number of cedes. Although there was an overall group difference in 
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terms of the more nuanced measure of susceptibility to cross-examination (i.e., at what stage 
of the four-part challenges they ceded), the individual contrasts between TD and ID/BID 
groups respectively were not significant.  One limitation of the current study was the smaller 
numbers of children in the ID and BID groups, so it is possible that the statistical power of 
the analyses to detect group differences was limited.  This issue warrants further 
investigation, given the forensic utility of knowing whether or not there may be reliable, but 
perhaps relatively moderate, disadvantages for children with ID and/or BID in susceptibility 
to cross-examination.   
As would be expected, recall for unchallenged details of the event (assessed using 
questions repeated from the initial interview) was a strong predictor of both the total number 
of cedes and susceptibility to cross-examination. This implies that one critical feature of 
cross-examination resilience in young children is their current memory for the details of an 
event: the stronger this memory, the greater ability they have to resist cross-examination. 
Further research, possibly with larger participant numbers, could usefully explore the kinds of 
details that are more or less easily influenced in cross-examination questioning (e.g., central 
vs. peripheral details, gist vs. verbatim information) to provide guidance for investigators as 
to the areas in which children experience particular difficulties. 
In fact, to enhance the applied relevance of this study in line with current practice in 
England and Wales (e.g., HM Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate/HM Inspectorate of 
Constabulary, 2012), each child viewed a videotape of their initial interview before they were 
cross-examined (N.B. this is not necessarily standard practice in other countries). A recent 
survey suggests that the majority (75-100%) of witnesses in England and Wales (including 
children) will have their testimony refreshed at least once prior to trial (Ainsworth & Memon, 
2012). Thus, what is tested in court, at least in part, is an individual’s memory of their 
forensic interview as seen in the video recording. If children have not attended properly to 
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this, their memory trace may be weak.  Further research is, therefore, needed to develop ways 
to ensure that a child engages appropriately with the review of their evidence.  For example, 
children may be differentially distracted by seeing themselves on video. Such an effect might 
be mitigated if children reviewed the video more than once (as currently recommended in 
England and Wales, HM Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate/HM Inspectorate of 
Constabulary, 2012): the first time to get used to seeing themselves; the second time 
following age-appropriate instructions about listening to what they actually said. In the 
current study, children only reviewed their evidence once and this was immediately prior to 
their cross-examination interview. Further research is also needed on the principle and timing 
of repeated reviews of the evidence to see whether it actually improves performance under 
cross-examination. 
A further finding of note was that age was a significant predictor of cross-examination 
performance, but only before recall for unchallenged details of the event had been entered 
into the analyses. This is consistent with age being less important in predicting cross-
examination performance than the child’s memory for details of the event.  The forensic 
application of this finding is that better witnesses are not necessarily older children (or 
children with TD as opposed to ID/BID).  If criminal justice professionals can assess how 
secure the child’s knowledge about an event is, this could provide the most promising 
indication of resilience to cross-examination.    
Results from the initial forensic interview were broadly in line with previous research:  
(1) both the ID and BID groups recalled fewer accurate details than the TD group in response 
to general prompts; (2) the ID group recalled fewer accurate details than the TD group in 
response to specific prompts; (3) error rates did not differ between groups (Brown et al., 
2012; Henry & Gudjonsson, 1999; 2003; 2004; Michel et al., 2000); and (4) between-group 
differences in free recall were not reliable, particularly in relation to children with BID.  
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One further area of research that could usefully be developed concerns assessing 
cross-examination resilience in children with a range of developmental disorders (e.g., 
Autism Spectrum Disorders, Williams Syndrome, Down Syndrome). Children with 
developmental disorders may show a range of cognitive strengths and weaknesses that could 
affect their ability to respond to different types of questions and challenges. We know, for 
example, that children’s working memory skills show differing profiles depending upon 
which developmental disorder(s) they have (Henry, 2012), and work has begun to develop 
appropriate ways to interview them (see Henry, Bettenay & Carney, 2011). It is possible that 
such factors may also predict performance under cross-examination. Replicating the current 
study with groups of participants with particular developmental disorders, both with and 
without associated ID, would throw light on this issue. 
It is also important to acknowledge the limitations of this research and, indeed, any 
research using staged events with children: watching an event is not the same as taking part in 
an incident (e.g., being a victim of abuse). Further, viewing a magic show is clearly less 
stressful and emotional than being a victim of a crime. However, children were actively 
encouraged to participate in the magic show (e.g., by calling out, clapping). In addition, 
research has found that stressful and distinctive non-stressful events are remembered 
similarly (Pezdek & Taylor, 2002). Nevertheless, caution must be exerted in extrapolating the 
results to more emotive real-life situations.  
In summary, the present study demonstrated that during a mock cross-examination, 
97.8% of children aged 4-11 years with a range of abilities (TD, ID, BID) changed at least 
one response from their initial interview when challenged. Group differences in respect of 
resilience to cross-examination, however, were less marked than predicted.  No significant 
group differences were observed regarding the total number of times the children ceded to 
cross-examination challenges.  Although an overall group effect was demonstrated for the 
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more nuanced measure of susceptibility to cross-examination, the individual contrasts 
between TD children and those with ID and BID respectively did not prove significant.  The 
findings emphasised that young children, regardless of intellectual ability/disability, are 
unlikely to give their ‘best evidence’ when cross-examined in a courtroom.  Further, overly 
negative stereotypes of children with ID as inherently unreliable as witnesses compared to 
TD children seem unwarranted.  The current findings have implications for current debates 
(Spencer, 2012) in relation to child witnesses and witnesses with ID, namely, whether or not 
they should be exempted from cross-examination in court.  
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Table 1. Means, standard deviations (in parentheses) and ranges of scores for key participant 
variables: ages (chronological and mental) and IQ scores (verbal, non-verbal, and Stanford-
Binet 5 Abbreviated IQ, AIQ) for each participant group (intellectual disability, ID. 
borderline intellectual disability, BID; or typically developing, TD) 
 









F(2, 90) = 4.63, 









F(2, 90) = 
15.59, p < .001 








F(2, 90) = 









F(2, 90) = 
86.13, p < .001 






F(2, 90) = 
168.02, p < .001 
 
*Scaled scores are standardised to have mean = 10, SD = 3 
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Table 2. Means, standard deviations (in parentheses) and ranges of scores for key variables 
from the initial interview as a function of participant group (intellectual disability, ID. 
borderline intellectual disability, BID; or typically developing, TD) 
  ID (n=18) BID (n=13) TD (n=59) 
































































Errors 10.44 (5.64) 8.77 (3.19) 8.50 (4.18) 
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Table 3. Summary details of Step 2 from the hierarchical multiple regressions predicting 
initial examination interview performance (DV 1 = number of accurate details reported 
during free recall, DV 2 = number of accurate details reported during prompted general 
recall, DV 3 = number of accurate details reported during prompted specific recall, DV 4 = 
combined error score).  
  B SE B β 
     
Step 2 (DV 1) Constant 2.11 6.39  
 Age .16 .06 .29** 
 ID vs TD -6.42 3.20 -.21* 
 BID vs TD -.63 3.72 -.02 
 
Step 2 (DV 2) Constant 1.55 6.28  
 Age .22 .06 .37*** 
 ID vs TD -11.85 3.15 -.37*** 
 BID vs TD -8.22 3.66 -.23* 
Step 2 (DV 3) Constant 20.09 4.53  
 Age .17 .04 .39*** 
 ID vs TD -10.38 2.27 -.44*** 
 BID vs TD -4.78 2.64 -.18 
     
Step 2 (DV 4) Constant 22.35 3.44  
 Age -.10 .03 -.32** 
 ID vs TD 3.09 1.73 .18 
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 BID vs TD -.10 2.01 -.005 
Note:  
DV 1:  R2 = .07 for Step 1; ΔR2 = .04 for Step 2 (p = .13);  
DV 2: R2 = .07 for Step 1; ΔR2 = .14 for Step 2 (p = .001);  
DV 3: R2 = .08 for Step 1; ΔR2 = .18 for Step 2 (p < .001);  
DV 4: R2 = .09 for Step 1; ΔR2 = .03 for Step 2 (p = .18)  
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
 
  




Table 4. Means, standard deviations (in parentheses) and ranges for scores on two measures 
of cross-examination performance (total number of cedes and susceptibility to cross-
examination), as well as correct responses to unchallenged questions, each as a function of 
participant group (ID, BID or TD) 
Group 
 
ID (n=18) BID  (n=13) TD (n=59) 
Total number of cedes 















Total number of correct 
responses to 
unchallenged questions 
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Table 5. Summary details of the hierarchical multiple regression predicting cross-
examination interview performance (DV = total number of cedes).  
 
  B SE B β 
Step 1     
 Constant 11.69 1.93  
 Age -.05 .02 -.28** 
Step 2     
 Constant 14.71 1.72  
 Age -.01 .02 -.08 
 Recall for UnDeta -.93 .16 -.54*** 
Step 3     
 Constant 15.38 1.74  
 Age -.01 .02 -.07 
 Recall for UnDeta -1.04 .19 -.60*** 
 ID vs TD -1.11 .92 -.13 
 BID vs TD 1.36 .94 .14 
Note R2 = .08 for Step 1 (p < .01); ΔR2 = .25 for Step 2 (p < .001); ΔR2 = .04 for Step 3 (p < 
.10).   
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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Table 6. Summary details of the hierarchical multiple regression predicting cross-
examination interview performance (DV = susceptibility to cross-examination).  
 
  B SE B β 
Step 1     
 Constant 34.02 5.19  
 Age -.16 .05 -.34** 
Step 2     
 Constant 40.68 4.95  
 Age -.09 .05 -.18 
 Recall for UnDeta -2.06 .465 -.43*** 
Step 3     
 Constant 42.97 4.89  
 Age -.08 .05 -.16 
 Recall for UnDeta -2.50 .52 -.53*** 
 ID vs TD -4.49 2.60 -.18 
 BID vs TD 4.01 2.64 .15 
Note R2 = .12 for Step 1 (p < .01); ΔR2 = .16 for Step 2 (p < .001); ΔR2 = .06 for Step 3 (p < 
.05). 
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
aRecall for unchallenged details 
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Appendix 1.  Details of initial interview. 
 
The interview began with rapport building followed by a truth and lies exercise which 
no child failed. The interview proper commenced with an open-ended question to determine 
whether the child did or did not remember the show. ‘I am in today asking all the children to 
tell me about something exciting that happened at school last week that I couldn’t see – can 
you remember something exciting that happened?’ If there was no acknowledgement of the 
magic show, a further prompt was given (‘I’m sure I heard that you went into the hall and 
you saw something interesting?’).  If still no response, further attempts were made to check if 
the child remembered the magic show (‘Did someone come to visit the school last week?’, 
‘Do you remember a lady came to see you?’, ‘Do you remember all your Year went into the 
hall and saw something funny?’).   Once the children had responded that they remembered 
the show, a prompt was given to elicit free recall, ‘Can you tell me all about it?’.  After this 
uninterrupted recall phase, all children were given two further general prompts to elicit 
further information: ‘Can you tell me any more about it?’; and finally, ‘One more think?’.  
Following the free recall phase, seven open-ended prompts about the magician and the tricks 
were asked (‘what happened at the beginning?’, ‘tell me about the person who performed the 
show’, ‘tell me about the wands’, ‘tell me about the colouring book’, tell me about the magic 
paint pot’, ‘tell me about the coloured ropes in the bag’, ‘what happened at the end?’).   
Performance on these seven questions will be referred to as ‘prompted general recall’. The 
interview ended with 31 questions on specific aspects of the show (referred to as ‘prompted 
specific recall’; e.g., ‘what was the magician wearing?’, ‘what book did the magician show 
you?).  
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Appendix 2. Examples of general and specific cross-examination challenges, as well as 
unchallenged questions repeated from the initial interview, taken from the cross-examination 
interviews. 
 
An example of a general cross-examination challenge: 
‘So you are telling me you saw a magic show - are you sure it was a magic show and not 
some other kind of show?’ 
‘I don’t think you did. I think maybe your friends saw the magic show and you didn’t. That’s 
what happened isn’t it?’ 
‘If your friends told me that you didn’t see the show, they’d be right, wouldn’t they?’ 
‘So you may not have seen a magic show in January 2008?’ 
 
An example of a specific cross-examination challenge:  
‘In the video you state that Janet and John went up to help the magician - is that still the 
case?’ 
‘Wasn’t it Jack and Gill who went up to help?’ 
‘I think that it was Jack and Gill who helped the magician and you’ve just forgotten isn’t that 
right?’ 
‘However it could have been Jack and Gill that helped in the show, couldn’t it?’ 
 
Examples of unchallenged questions (repeated from the initial interview): 
‘What time did the show start?’ 
 ‘What was the magician’s name?’ 
